The systematic interplay of changing knowledge and changing objectives results in the redefinition of “issues” and the practice of “issue linkage.” The dynamics of issue-linkage, in turn, tell us something about international regimes for the management of progressively more complex issue areas. Why do nations create institutionalized modes of multilateral collaboration? How can common interests develop in the face of inequalities in power and asymmetries in interdependence? The author explores the role of knowledge in the definition of political objectives and interests. In contrast, a location with more diverse comparative advantages is able to implement more compelling policy elements that punish uncooperative firms. It must accordingly reshape collective goods provision around policies favored by business. Comparing collective skill formation in two heavily globalized cantons of Switzerland, I show that a region fundamentally relying on low-tax policies sees its hands increasingly tied in the face of globalization. I argue that these challenges do not lead to convergence between globalized locations as the structural power of business depends on the type of firms attracted by local institutional comparative advantages. Increased capital mobility, characterized by new exit opportunities for business and an influx of multinational companies not anchored in their new home-countries’ institutional environment, loosens those ‘beneficial constraints’. Problems of various-sized units, transaction costs, and technological change must be considered.Ĭollective goods provision, most prominent in coordinated market economies, depends on certain institutional conditions that constrain employer behavior and trigger cooperation. Third, the models are more difficult to operationalize for empirical analysis than currently recognized.
It is therefore difficult to rely on their models for prediction of political behavior. Second, theorists like Samuelson and Olson not only employ very different definitions, they also make a number of questionable assumptions in their models, or overlook logical major possibilities for collective behavior. Each of the four major definitional criteria - joint supply, nonexcludability, indivisibility of benefits and impossibility of appropriation - can lead to a very dfferent conclusion from the others about the likelihood that self-interested individuals will contribute to a collective effort. First, major theorists about collective goods actually employ widely differing definitions of a collective good.
This paper reexamines collective goods' theory in order to demonstrate three sets of problems facing scholars seeking to employ it for political analysis.
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